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Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver 
(1942)
RICHARD NOLAN
A. INTRODUCTION
A
LMOST 70 YEARS have passed since the House of Lords’ decision 
in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver,1 and over 40 years since it 
figured so prominently in Boardman v Phipps,2 yet little is known 
about the very strange course of the proceedings in Regal. At first instance, 
and in the Court of Appeal, Regal was argued and decided as a case at 
common law for negligence, money had and received, or misfeasance. It 
was not treated as a case in equity, let alone a leading case in equity, until 
it reached the House of Lords. Yet the facts found by the trial judge make 
it as plain as could be that Regal was a case where the defendant directors 
had material conflicts of duty and interest. Strangely, these conflicts were 
never presented in argument as the basis for a decision. Instead, the House 
of Lords ultimately decided the case by applying in a perfectly orthodox 
fashion the principle that a fiduciary may not make an unauthorised profit 
out of his position. And the highly unsatisfactory course of the proceedings 
demonstrates the need for this principle to support the rules governing a 
fiduciary’s conflict of duty and interest, and the goals served by those rules. 
The directors in Regal were far from the innocent victims of harsh law 
rigidly applied.
In order to establish and understand these points, it is vital to go back 
into the records of the case—the pleadings and other documents, and the 
judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal—which are still 
preserved in the Library of the House of Lords. The judgments of the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal in Regal have never been reported, 
1 Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378, [1967] 2 AC 134n (HL). Citations in 
subsequent footnotes are to the Official Reports. 
2 Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL).
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despite the importance of the case.3 Yet to read a final appellate decision in 
isolation from the proceedings and judgments in the lower courts is to invite 
misunderstanding, and all the more so in a case such as Regal where House 
of Lords reversed the decisions of both the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal. The exigencies of wartime may account for the lack of reporting. 
The writ which began the Regal case was issued on 15 December 1939, just 
over three months into the Second World War, and the case was heard in 
war-torn London. Indeed, the oral judgment of the High Court in Regal was 
interrupted by an air raid.4 Yet the connected case of Luxor (Eastbourne) 
Ltd v Cooper is reported at all of its stages, in the King’s Bench Division, 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.5 But whatever the explanation 
for this lack of reporting, and it is unlikely ever to be known, facts come 
before judgments, whether reported or unreported; and the facts of Regal 
merit careful examination.
B. FACTS
The plaintiff company, Regal, owned and operated a freehold cinema in 
Hastings. Regal was part of a group that ran several cinemas on the South 
Coast of England in the 1930s. (My mother, who was growing up in Sussex 
at that time, was a regular patron of the Regal in Littlehampton.) Together, 
these cinemas were known as the Bentley Circuit, after Mr Walter Bentley, 
who was the leading light in the business, managing director of Regal and 
its majority shareholder.
In 1935, as the threat of another war in Europe was growing, busi-
ness was still good for Regal, and it wished to acquire leases of two other 
local cinemas, the Cinema de Luxe, Hastings, and the Elite Cinema in 
3 It appears that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Regal was examined by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper [1966] SCR 673, 682–83, 
(1966) 58 DLR (2d) 1, 8–9 (Cartwright J). But that is the only reference to a consideration of 
the earlier proceedings discovered so far. Some other prominent equity cases have suffered a 
similar fate of much comment based on limited and inadequate reports. Two such are Jacobus 
Estates Ltd v Marler (1913) 114 LT 640n (HL) and Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 
932 (HL). In Jacobus, even the decision of the House of Lords itself is inadequately reported. 
Again, the full text of the pleadings, arguments, judgments and speeches in those cases are 
available in the Appeal Books of the House of Lords.
4 See the judgment of Wrottesley J, reported in the documents put before the House of 
Lords (the ‘Appeal Book’), 77. The sang-froid of the judge and the reporter is beautifully 
illustrative of the times. There is simply an italicised insertion within the judgment: ‘At this 
point an air raid warning sounded and the Court adjourned.’ After that, the judgment resumed 
with the words: ‘I think when the interval occurred I had reached the point that ...’ The court 
kept calm and carried on.
5 Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1939] 1 All ER 623 (KBD); [1939] 4 All ER 411 (CA); 
[1941] AC 108 (HL).
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St-Leonards-on-Sea. Mr Bentley had been looking to sell his interests in 
the business for a couple of years before that, but no acceptable deal had 
yet materialised.6 So Regal intended to run all three cinemas when the 
acquisition of the two new leases was first mooted, but the possibility of 
selling all the cinemas (including the Cinema de Luxe and the Elite) was 
always, and explicitly, a possibility.7
The directors of Regal did not want to expose the company to the risks 
of running the Cinema de Luxe and the Elite, so it formed a subsidiary com-
pany, Hastings Amalgamated Cinemas Ltd (‘Amalgamated’), with a nomi-
nal capital of 5,000 £1 shares, to take a lease of those two cinemas.8 As the 
speeches in their Lordships’ House make clear, the original scheme was for 
only 2,000 of these shares to be issued and paid up in cash (others were to be 
issued for services rendered), but the owner of the cinemas declined to grant 
a lease to Amalgamated if it only had a cash capital of £2,000. There were 
two possible ways forward which were acceptable to the lessor of Cinema 
de Luxe and the Elite. One possibility was for the directors of Regal to 
guarantee the rent payable by Amalgamated in respect of the two cinemas. 
Unsurprisingly, the directors were loath to do this, and they certainly had no 
duty to offer such a guarantee. The other possibility was to put £5,000 cash 
capital into Amalgamated. Though it later became a matter of some dis-
pute, it was held that Regal could not afford to put more than £2,000 into 
Amalgamated. So four of Regal’s directors and its solicitor each subscribed 
for 500 shares in Amalgamated, and the fifth director found some outsiders 
to take up another 500. This would provide a total of £5,000 in cash capital 
for Amalgamated: £2,000 from Regal, plus six tranches of £500.
At the time these arrangements were being made, London and Southern 
Super Cinemas Ltd made an offer to acquire the freehold of the Regal Cinema 
in Hastings and the Luxor Cinema in Eastbourne, as well as the two lease-
hold cinemas in Hastings once they had been acquired by Amalgamated.9 
The motivation for that offer may well have been the sudden death, on 
11 September 1935, of Mr Walter Bentley, which would have sent a signal 
to other cinema operators that the businesses would likely be put up for 
sale.10 In the event, this offer was considered by the boards of both Regal 
and Hastings Amalgamated on the same day—2 October 1935—and at 
  6 Appeal Book, 72C–E (Wrottesley J).
  7 Appeal Book, 73E–74D (Wrottesley J); Case for the Appellants in the House of Lords, 
[10]–[14].
   8 Appeal Book, 74B–C, 76D–77A (Wrottesley J).
   9 Appeal Book, 79E–81E (Wrottesley J); Case for the Appellants in the House of Lords, 
[28]–[30]. These negotiations later formed the subject matter of Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v 
Cooper [1941] AC 108.
10 Appeal Book, 80C–E (Wrottesley J). The directors of Luxor were the same individuals 
as the directors of Regal.
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the same meetings the boards passed the necessary resolutions to capitalise 
Amalgamated as described above.11 On 7 October 1935, Amalgamated 
acquired leases of the Cinema de Luxe and the Elite,12 and the next day, 
the offer from London and Southern was accepted, subject to contract, by 
the solicitor acting for both Regal and Amalgamated.13 However, just over 
two weeks later, on 24 October 1935, the shares in Regal, together with the 
3,000 shares in Amalgamated which were not owned by Regal, were sold to 
another bidder, Oxford & Berkshire Cinemas Ltd.14 The directors had appor-
tioned part of the total consideration received from Oxford & Berkshire to 
the sale of shares in Amalgamated,15 and this apportionment meant that each 
defendant made a profit of £1,402 1s 8d from the sale of his 500 shares in 
Amalgamated.16
Under its new owners, Regal sued its five former directors and its 
former solicitor. The action against the solicitor, Mr Garton, failed, as 
he had purchased shares in Amalgamated with the consent of Regal’s 
board. The action against four of the directors (Messrs Bobby, Griffiths, 
Bassett and Bentley) succeeded finally in the House of Lords, having 
failed in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal. These four were 
the directors who had taken the shares in Amalgamated on their own 
behalf. The fifth and final director, Mr Gulliver, did not take shares for 
his own benefit but as nominee for others, so the House of Lords held 
that he had made no profit personally for which he could be accountable 
to Regal.
C. THE STRANGE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: PLEADINGS, 
COUNSEL AND ARGUMENTS
The clearest indication that there was something very odd about the start 
of the proceedings in Regal comes, ironically, at the very end of those pro-
ceedings, in the final speech given by Lord Porter.17 He noted that Regal’s 
pleaded case was never drawn as a claim for an account of profits in equity, 
11 Appeal Book, 82B–84E (Wrottesley J); Case for the Appellants in the House of Lords, 
[31]–[32].
12 Case for the Appellants in the House of Lords, [35].
13 Ibid, [35].
14 This is the name given to the purchaser company in the Regal case itself, but in the related 
case of Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper (n 9) 133, Lord Wright appeared to indicate that the 
sale was made to a company called ‘Union Cinemas Ltd’. Lord Wright might, perhaps, have 
been referring to the company that bought Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd, though he in fact made 
no distinction between Luxor and Regal.
15 Appeal Book, 83–84, 89–90 (Wrottesley J); 108–09, 115 (Lord Greene MR); Case for the 
Appellants in the House of Lords, [36].
16 Case for the Appellants in the House of Lords, [36]–[37].
17 Regal (n 1) 157–58. There is also a hint in the speech of Lord Russell, ibid, 143.
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but as three common law claims. The prayer for relief in the statement of 
claim in fact made three alternative claims: 
(a) a claim for damages for negligence of £8,142 10s;18 
(b)  a claim for £8,412 10s as money had and received by the defendants 
to the plaintiff’s use; and 
(c)  a claim of £8,412 10s damages for misfeasance against the sixth defen-
dant, the solicitor Mr Garton.19
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the trial of the case in 1940 was listed 
and heard in the King’s Bench Division, rather than the Chancery Division. 
The whole tenor of the case, before it reached the House of Lords, was that 
of an action at common law. Viscount Sankey noted that ‘[a]s to the duties 
and liabilities of those occupying such a fiduciary position, a number of 
cases were cited to us which were not brought to the attention of the trial 
judge.’20 What in fact happened was stranger still. Neither the High Court 
nor the Court of Appeal cited any authority whatsoever: a reader will search 
the judgments in those courts in vain for the name or facts of a single author-
ity. In both the King’s Bench Division and in the Court of Appeal, Regal was 
decided on its facts and in accordance with what must have been taken as 
clearly settled principle. It is a reminder in the strongest terms, if one were 
needed, of just how the course of a case, and the law it considers and creates, 
is shaped by the way the case is presented and argued by counsel.
Counsel for Regal at trial was the appropriately named leading advocate, 
and former Labour Attorney-General, Sir Patrick Hastings KC. Beatrice Webb 
described him as ‘an unpleasant type of clever pleader and political arriviste, 
who jumped into the Labour Party just before the 1922 election, when it 
had become clear that the Labour Party was the alternative government and 
it had not a single lawyer of position attached to it’.21 His Conservative for-
mer friends were no kinder.22 But whatever his political beliefs, and even if 
his political motivations were base, they at least serve to remind us that we 
should not view the past through rose-tinted spectacles. More significantly, 
perhaps, and though he was seen as a ‘lawyer of position’, even by his critics, 
it is fair to say that he was not a Chancery lawyer: his famous cases involved 
mainly crime, fraud, libel.23 All of these require great forensic skill and mas-
tery of cross-examination, but not much knowledge of equity.
18 This figure may well be a misprint in the prayer for relief, instead of £8,412 10s.
19 Lord Porter’s summary of the claims (Regal (n 1) 157–58) is slightly misleading in regard 
to the third claim, which was a claim for misfeasance only against Mr Garton, not against 
all the defendants. There was also an irrelevant fourth additional claim for £233 15s against 
Mr Garton for money had and received to the use of the plaintiff.
20 Regal (n 1) 137.
21 N and J Mackenzie (eds), The Diary of Beatrice Webb, Volume 4 (1924–1943) (London, 
Virago, 1985) 19–20.
22 P Hastings, The Life of Patrick Hastings (London, Cresset Press, 1959) 114.
23 Ibid.
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How much use Sir Patrick could make of his skills as an advocate in a case 
such as Regal was limited by the facts, the pleadings and the law. The state 
of company law at the time also limited the scope for success in a pleaded 
case of negligence. In 1935 when the events at issue happened, and equally 
in 1940 when they were under investigation at trial, the standard of care 
and skill expected of directors was taken to be the very relaxed standard 
established in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd24 and Re City 
Equitable Fire Insurance Co25: in the performance of his duties, a director 
did not need to exhibit a greater degree of skill than might reasonably be 
expected from someone with his knowledge and experience. Indeed, this 
standard began to rise only decades later.26 The low threshold of liability 
meant that it was very difficult—in practical terms, impossible—to show 
the directors had been negligent in failing to obtain better terms for Regal 
in the acquisition of the Cinema de Luxe and the Elite Cinema. Given this 
concatenation of the facts, the pleadings and the law, the case of negligence 
as advanced by Sir Patrick Hastings was doomed to fail. And fail it did. 
The action for money had and received fared no better. The trial judge, 
Wrottesley J, took the view that the claim for money had and received 
could succeed on proof of fraud—that is, if the defendants were shown to 
have made their respective profits ‘corruptly’. This was fatal to the claim 
for money had and received. First, there was an express refusal by the trial 
judge to find fraud as a matter of fact.27 Secondly, the pleaded case did not 
allege fraud, which precluded any finding of fraud, though it was left to the 
Court of Appeal to re-assert this rule.28
Leading counsel for the defendants at trial were Mr AT Denning KC, 
Mr Wynn Parry and Mr Cartwright Sharp KC, with Mr TF Davis appear-
ing for the fifth defendant, Harry Bentley. It is not often realised that Lord 
Denning, as he later became, appeared for Mr Gulliver both in the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal, before wartime duties took him elsewhere 
so that he could not appear in the case before the House of Lords. Clearly, 
the defendants thought it worthwhile to retain very eminent counsel, as 
they might when faced with the reputation of Sir Patrick Hastings on the 
other side, though they could not then have realised quite what prominent 
careers on the bench lay before both Mr Denning and Mr Wynn Parry. Both 
of them surely would have seen the weakness of the plaintiff’s arguments: 
24 Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425.
25 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] Ch 408.
26 See Norman v Theodore Goddard [1991] BCLC 1028 (Ch D); Re D’Jan of London 
Ltd, Copp v D’Jan [1994] 1 BCLC 561 (Ch D); Equitable Life v Bowley [2003] EWHC 2263 
(Comm), [2004] 1 BCLC 180 (QBD); and, now, Companies Act 2006, s 174.
27 Appeal Book, 94 (Wrottesley J, summing up).
28 Appeal Book, 119 (du Parcq LJ). The slightly earlier comments of du Parcq LJ (on the 
same page) about the absence of fraud were cited in the House of Lords by Viscount Sankey: 
Regal (n 1) 136. See now CPR 16 PD 8.2.
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one may have become a judge of the King’s Bench Division, but he was 
most certainly aware of equitable doctrine; the other became a judge of the 
Chancery Division. But neither of them had to point out to the plaintiff, or 
to the court, the inadequacies of Sir Patrick’s presentation of the case.
In the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, Sir Patrick Hastings’ 
place was taken by Mr AT Miller KC. But only in the House of Lords was 
Regal’s argument founded squarely on breach of fiduciary duty: counsel for 
Regal set out in extenso the authorities on breach of fiduciary duty for the 
first time only in their written Case for the House of Lords.29
One other point emerges clearly from that written case, which, if better 
known, would have served to quiet much of the speculation in subsequent 
years. Regal’s case ‘was not a case of an investment being offered to Regal 
from some outside source and bona fide rejected by Regal’.30 This point 
was explicitly made in reaction to a part of the judgment of Lord Greene 
MR in the Court of Appeal, where he made the following remarks:31
To say that the Company was entitled to claim the benefit of those shares [in 
Amalgamated] would involve this proposition: Where a Board of Directors con-
siders an investment which is offered to their company and bona fide comes to the 
conclusion that it is not an investment which their company ought to make, any 
director, after that Resolution is come to and bona fide come to, who chooses to 
put up the money for that investment himself, must be treated as having done it 
on behalf of the Company, so that the Company can claim any profit that results 
to him from it. That is a proposition for which no particle of authority was cited; 
and goes, it seems to me, far beyond anything that has ever been suggested as to 
the duty of directors, agents, or persons in a position of that kind.
Regal’s case, in other words, as presented in the House of Lords, where 
questions of fiduciary duty were finally and explicitly in issue, never even 
purported to comprehend facts such as those later at issue in Peso Silver 
Mines Ltd v Cropper;32 and the alleged contradiction between the two cases 
is at most apparent, not real.33
The case for Regal was in fact put much more narrowly: this was a case 
where the directors’ profit stemmed from two key facts which made the 
profit attributable to their position in a sufficiently direct and close fashion 
29 Case for the Appellants in the House of Lords, [44]–[48]. The question of liability of the 
directors for profits was rather briefly canvassed in the Court of Appeal (Appeal Book, 111 
and 115–17, Lord Greene MR), but the treatment of the issue is without any authority and is 
deeply problematic for other reasons, namely, the mischaracterisation of the case as involving 
simply the rejection of an opportunity by Regal that could consequently be taken by the direc-
tors (see below and the text to n 31), and the confusion of liability for the directors’ profits 
with some breach of a duty, owed to Regal, to acquire the shares in Amalgamated (addressed 
in the text to n 62 and following).
30 Case for the Appellants in the House of Lords, [46].
31 Appeal Book, 116; Case for the Appellants in the House of Lords, [45].
32 Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper [1966] SCR 673, (1966) 58 DLR (2d) 1.
33 See further the text to n 136 and following.
506 Richard Nolan
as to render them accountable to the company for the profit.34 The two 
facts were as follows. First of all, ‘[i]t was only because the Respondents 
[defendants] controlled both Regal and [Hastings] Amalgamated that 
they were able to allot shares in [Hastings] Amalgamated as they were 
minded’,35 and so were able to sell those shares at a profit. Secondly, it was 
vital to the defendants that Regal remained involved in the transactions 
(the capitalisation of Amalgamated and the acquisition of the leases of the 
Cinema de Luxe and the Elite Cinema) through which the defendants made 
their profits. The purchase price for the shares in Regal and Amalgamated 
was calculated on the basis that the freehold cinema owned by Regal 
was worth £77,500 as a going concern, free from encumbrances, and the 
cinemas leased at a rack rent by Amalgamated were worth £15,000 on the 
same basis.36 The leases of the Cinema de Luxe and the Elite Cinema held 
by Amalgamated, to which £15,000 value was ascribed, had, however, been 
acquired only a few days before the share sale for no capital premium: they 
were simply rack rental leases.37 It is hard, indeed impossible, to see how 
such an uplift in capital value of £15,000 over a few days could be achieved 
other than by the leases becoming part of a wider set of valuable business 
assets—including, crucially, Regal’s assets.38
So the notion that Regal concerned the bona fide rejection of an oppor-
tunity followed by the directors’ own personal and profitable realisation 
of that opportunity is misplaced and confusing. To represent the case in 
those terms—as a case where there was simply an opportunity to subscribe 
for 3,000 shares in Amalgamated, which was rejected by Regal but taken 
by Regal’s directors and solicitor to their profit—is simply wrong. Other 
factors— including the directors’ control of both Regal and Amalgamated, 
as well as the continued involvement of Regal in the scheme—were neces-
sary, indeed crucial, causes of the profits in question. Lord Russell alluded 
34 Regal (n 1) 153 (Lord Macmillan). The requirement of a close connection between posi-
tion and profit importantly serves to constrain the scope of the ‘no unauthorised profits’ rule, 
and so goes to meet some of the concerns about overly broad application of the rule. See gener-
ally in this regard, M Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 209.
35 Case for the Appellants in the House of Lords, [46].
36 Appeal Book, 83–84, 89–90 (Wrottesley J); 108–09, 115 (Lord Greene MR); Case for 
the Appellants in the House of Lords, [36]. This apportionment is very similar to the division 
of the total consideration in the earlier proposal to sell the cinemas themselves (rather than 
shares in the companies that owned them) to London & Southern Super Cinemas Ltd: Regal 
(n 1) 142 (Lord Russell).
37 Re-amended Statement of Claim, [8].
38 Lord Russell, like the trial judge and the Court of Appeal, took a benign—perhaps 
overly benign—view of this apportionment and its propriety: Regal (n 1) 142. But that does 
not affect the point made here, that even if £15,000 is properly attributable to the leases held 
by Amalgamated, that value could only have arisen because those leases were now, but not 
previously, operated in conjunction with Regal’s assets. 
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to this point, but unfortunately without spelling out the reasons as clearly 
as they appear from the background documentation to his decision:39
In his judgment Lord Greene MR, stated that a decision adverse to the directors 
in the present case involved the proposition that, if directors bona fide decide 
not to invest their company’s funds in some proposed investment, a director who 
thereafter embarks his own money therein is accountable for any profits which 
he may derive therefrom. As to this, I can only say that to my mind the facts of 
this hypothetical case bear but little resemblance to the story with which we have 
had to deal.
And there is, in fact, another good reason why Regal is very different from 
Peso. This is an issue raised in the pleadings of Regal but never developed 
in any of the judgments: the question of authorisation for the directors to 
make the profit. But before considering this omission, there is the matter of 
what was said in the various judgments.
D. THE UNREPORTED JUDGMENTS
The first and most striking point is the wrong turn taken right at the start 
of Wrottesley J’s judgment:40
[I]n order to succeed the Plaintiff Company must show that the Defendants 
both ought to have caused and could have caused the Plaintiff Company to sub-
scribe for these shares and that the neglect to do so caused a loss to the Plaintiff 
Company. Short of this, if the Plaintiffs [sic] can establish that though no loss 
was made by the Company yet a profit was corruptly made by the Directors and 
the Solicitor, then the Company can claim to have that profit handed over to the 
Company, framing the action in such a case for money had and received by the 
Defendants to the Plaintiffs’ use.
It is hardly surprising, as noted earlier, that the directors escaped liability 
for negligence, given the state of directors’ duties of care and skill at the 
time (quite aside from whether Regal was able to subscribe for the shares). 
It is equally unsurprising that a claim against the directors for money had 
and received also failed, as fraud had to be shown to establish a common 
law entitlement to the directors’ profits as money had and received to the 
plaintiff’s use, and fraud—that the directors made the profits ‘corruptly’—
was neither pleaded nor proved.41
Wrottesley J certainly did not think that the directors had been negligent 
in failing to investigate other sources of finance which would have put 
Regal in funds to subscribe for 5,000 shares in Amalgamated rather than 
39 Regal (n 1) 152–53.
40 Appeal Book, 71C–D. See also Appeal Book, 111 (Lord Greene MR).
41
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2,000. The facts, however, were more equivocal than might be supposed. 
Wrottesley J was very ready to accept the directors’ contention that funding 
from Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd, a connected company, would have been inap-
propriate, as Regal and Luxor had no community of commercial interest, 
operating in markets (Hastings and Eastbourne) which were so far apart.42 
But surely, even in the 1930s, towns just 18 miles apart were not in utterly 
different commercial worlds. And there was clearly enough community of 
interest from the perspective of a potential purchaser of cinema businesses 
that, at the very same meeting where the board of Amalgamated rejected 
the idea of finance from Luxor, it was noted that the company’s business 
was being marketed jointly with those of Regal and Luxor.43 Similarly, the 
judge was willing to dismiss the possibility of bank funding for Regal (even 
though none was ever sought) on the evidence of Regal’s bank manager, 
and to dismiss the evidence of a chartered accountant called as witness for 
Regal;44 and the point was thought so clear by the Court of Appeal that it 
questioned whether there had really been any need to hear from the bank 
manager.45
The baleful influence of negligence reasoning may be discerned distinctly 
in two other ways. First, the fact that Regal was held unable to afford more 
than 2,000 shares in Amalgamated necessarily implied that the directors 
could not have failed in their duties of care and skill by failing to cause 
Regal to purchase all 5,000 issued shares in Amalgamated.46 Indeed, seen 
from this perspective, the directors (and Mr Garton) had positively acted 
in Regal’s best interests by purchasing the balance of 3,000 shares, because 
that was the only plausible means of ensuring that Amalgamated was in a 
position to satisfy the landlord of the Cinema de Luxe and the Elite Cinema 
as to its financial position and so acquire a lease of each those cinemas.47 
(It was held—rightly—that the directors had no duty to give a guarantee of 
rents payable under those leases, which was the only other viable way of 
satisfying the landlord.48) The second influence of negligence reasoning is 
that the actions of various directors are said to have inflicted no recoverable 
loss on Regal. Notwithstanding that these directors clearly were, at times, 
oblivious to the fact that their duty to act in the best interests of the com-
pany meant the best interests of all shareholders in the company,49 and they 
did not distinguish adequately between the various interests of different 
42 Appeal Book, 83E–G.
43 Appeal Book, 83–84 (Wrottesley J). See also Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper (n 9).
44 Appeal Book, 89B–E, 90G, 94B.
45 Appeal Book, 112–13 (Lord Greene MR).
46 Appeal Book, 112, 114–15 (Lord Greene MR).
47 Appeal Book, 87 (Wrottesley J).
48 Appeal Book, 113–14 (Lord Greene MR).
49 Appeal Book, 85, 90 (Wrottesley).
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companies,50 no liability resulted from these slips. The tacit assumption is 
that, in the circumstances, loss was the gist of the action. And, of course, 
in so far as the action was a claim for negligence, that would be entirely 
correct.51
The trial judgment also preserves an interesting contrast to the duties of 
Regal’s directors: that was the duty of Mr Harry Bentley, one of the defen-
dant directors, as administrator of his late father’s estate. Harry Bentley’s 
father, Walter Bentley, had been the leading light in Regal until his death on 
11 September 1935, shortly before the material events in the case. Initially, 
Harry Bentley was opposed to the proposal that directors of Regal should 
personally take shares in Amalgamated and allocate a value of £15,000 to 
the leases that were to be acquired by Amalgamated when apportioning 
the price London & Southern proposed to pay for all the four cinemas it 
wished to acquire from Regal, Amalgamated and Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd.52 
He objected that ‘the allocation will give the Directors and the Solicitor a 
personal advantage which rightly belongs to the Company [ie, Regal] and 
which will cause a serious loss to his father’s estate’.53 This objection was 
later withdrawn, when Harry Bentley had apparently been advised by 
his lawyers that it was his best course of action as administrator of his 
father’s estate to participate in the share issue by Amalgamated.54 Indeed, 
Wrottesley J thought that Harry Bentley ‘did no more than his duty as 
Administrator in falling in with the proposals of those other Directors’.55 
Now it is logically and legally consistent to say, on the one hand, that the 
directors had taken sufficient action to discharge their duty to Regal to 
investigate the opportunity for the company to subscribe for another 3,000 
shares in Amalgamated, but, on the other hand, that Harry Bentley still 
had a duty as administrator of his late father’s estate to pursue the like 
opportunity to subscribe for 500 shares in Amalgamated. Nevertheless, that 
consistency does depend crucially on the directors having made sufficient, 
if ultimately unsuccessful, efforts on behalf of Regal to acquire and pay 
for the 3,000 shares. It is impossible not to wonder whether a little more 
effort by the directors might have been in order when lawyers were firmly 
advising one of them that he should pursue the opportunity in another 
capacity.
50 Appeal Book, 88 (Wrottesley J). See also the text to n 27 and following.
51 C Walton (ed), Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence, 12th edn (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2010) [1-34], [5-01]–[5-41].
52 Appeal Book, 85–86 (Wrottesley J).
53 Appeal Book, 86D (Wrottesley J), quoting from a letter of 3 September, 1935, written 
by solicitors (Messrs Bulcraig & Davis) on behalf of Harry Bentley. See also the Re-amended 
Statement of Claim, [11].
54 Appeal Book, 89, 91 (Wrottesley J).
55 Appeal Book, 91C.
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The High Court also considered the case for Regal on the basis that 
the directors had ‘corruptly’ made their profit and should pay it over to 
the company.56 What the court meant by ‘corruptly’ is never spelt out, 
but it appeared to mean either that the directors intended to deprive the 
company of a profit (which was an argument going nowhere, given that 
fraud had not been proven),57 or that the directors (and Mr Garton) had 
a ‘practical certainty’ of their eventual profit at the time they bought 
their shares in Amalgamated.58 Notwithstanding the very tight timing of 
events,59 Wrottesley J did not think the directors’ profit could be treated 
as a  ‘practical certainty’ on the fateful day, 2 October 1935, when they 
bought their shares in Amalgamated and committed whatever breach of 
duty, if any, there might be.60 This does seem, admittedly at the distance 
of over 70 years, a very generous finding of fact: London & Southern had 
made an offer for the cinemas by 2 October 1935, and, as very soon became 
clear, Oxford and Berkshire was interested in them; and if either transaction 
proceeded, the directors stood to make their profit. (It cannot be imagined 
that a particular profit derived from a particular purchaser had to be in 
mind for the profit to be a ‘practical certainty’.) So findings of fact  generous 
to the defendants were judged by a criterion of liability that was very 
narrow; it was hardly surprising, therefore, that the defendants emerged 
unscathed. All very different from the House of Lords, where  questions 
of good faith or ‘corrupt’ behaviour were irrelevant to the  defendants’ 
 ultimate liabilities.61
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Greene MR took the case in the alternative: 
either it was about misfeasance by the directors in failing to realise for 
Regal the opportunity to buy the extra 3,000 shares in Amalgamated, or 
else it was about the directors (and Mr Garton) having bought the 3,000 
shares while acting in the matter of their office.62 Both claims, according 
to Lord Greene, relied crucially on the existence of a duty on the directors 
to acquire the 3,000 shares in Amalgamated for Regal.63 So even though 
the second of the alternatives looks like a claim based simply on abuse 
of position, it was not: it was a claim based on the directors’ failure to 
 perform their duties and thereby profit from their failure. Lord Greene 
firmly  followed Wrottesley J in holding that the directors no longer had 
56 See the text to n 40.
57 Appeal Book, 94 (Wrottesley J, summing up). See also ibid, 90F, as regards Mr Bobby.
58 Appeal Book, 85 (Wrottesley J).
59 See the text to n 11.
60 Appeal Book, 87. Lord Greene MR in the Court of Appeal agreed: ibid, 107.
61 Regal (n 1) 144 (Lord Russell).
62 Appeal Book, 111.
63 Ibid, 111.
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any such duty by the time they invested in Amalgamated,64 so both claims 
were bound to fail.
As regards the first claim, Lord Greene thoroughly investigated the finan-
cial position of Regal and concluded that the directors had made a bona 
fide decision to cause Regal to acquire just 2,000 shares in Amalgamated, 
and that terminated any duty they had in respect of the remaining 3,000 
shares. Indeed, Lord Greene found the directors’ reasons very convincing. 
As regards the second claim, Lord Greene re-emphasised that the directors 
would be accountable only if they had a duty to acquire the 3,000 shares 
in Amalgamated for Regal at the time they in fact acquired the shares for 
themselves. They would still have had such a duty if, for example, they had 
rejected the opportunity on behalf of Regal in bad faith or dishonestly. But 
that was not so, and the claim failed. So, for Lord Greene, the case turned 
crucially on that duty, and whether the directors actually breached it: he did 
not see the case in terms of a conflict of duty and interest, just in terms of 
breach (or not) of a duty to acquire the 3,000 shares in Amalgamated. To 
put the point in more general terms, he did not see the case in terms of the 
risk of harm but in terms of the infliction of harm. That is hardly surpris-
ing given the flawed way in which the case was put to him. But it omits to 
address fiduciary law and its key concern, as will be seen below.
Mackinnon LJ agreed with the Master of the Rolls, but chose to focus 
exclusively on the directors’ alleged negligence in failing to procure the 
3,000 shares in Amalgamated for Regal.65 Again, it is hardly surprising that 
claim failed given the prior findings of fact. Du Parcq LJ confined himself 
to agreement with the Master of the Rolls, and to some observations on the 
pleading and proof of fraud.66
These, then, are the judgments which formed the flawed but inescapable 
background to the case when it reached the House of Lords by special 
leave of their Lordships.67 The whole case had been presented in the lower 
courts as a failure by the directors to act in a proper way. The emphasis was 
always on the infliction of harm, even though the harm, if inflicted deliber-
ately or ‘corruptly’, might entitle Regal to the profits made by the directors 
and Mr Garton. And the findings of fact were such that the allegations of 
failure to act and resultant harm, let alone deliberate harm, could only fail. 
The case was never presented as a failure by the directors to refrain from 
action in certain circumstances where there was the risk of harm because of 
the directors’ conflict of duty and interest. Even in written arguments for 
the House of Lords, counsel for Regal submitted only that the directors had 
made a profit from their position and were therefore, and without proof 
64 Ibid, 111–15.
65 Appeal Book, 117–18.
66 Appeal Book, 119–20.
67 The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords: Appeal Book, 120.
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of bad faith, accountable in equity for that profit.68 In these circumstances, 
the House of Lords had to approach the case as one where liability turned 
simply on what the directors had actually done, albeit in good faith and 
without negligence:69 their Lordships had to take the case as it came before 
them, not as it might have been put to them. Thus it was that the decision 
of the House of Lords had to be founded on the directors’ abuse of their 
position.70 But the case could have been made very differently: there are 
significant omissions from the arguments as put. 
E. THE STRANGE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: OMISSIONS
The most obvious omission from Regal is of more historical than practical 
interest. That is the omission of any argument founded on equitable 
principles until the proceedings before the House of Lords. Leading and 
easily accessible texts of the day were in no doubt of the existence of 
potential claims in equity on facts such as those of Regal.71 The clearest 
contemporaneous statement of the law, published just a year before the 
issue of proceedings in Regal, and following earlier such statements, is in 
the sixteenth edition of Palmer’s Company Law:72
Directors, as we have seen, are agents of the company, and it is a well settled 
rule that an agent cannot, without the knowledge and consent of his principal, 
be allowed to make any profit out of the matter of his agency beyond his proper 
remuneration.
There might well have been some considerable dispute about the strength 
of any such argument on the facts; but it is very hard to see why the prima 
facie relevance of such arguments were overlooked until so late in the day. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to resolve that question at this distance in 
time. The Appeal Books of the House of Lords contain the best evidence 
of counsels’ various submissions in Regal, and the stage at which they 
were made; but neither the Appeal Books nor any other available evidence 
68 Case for the Appellants, particularly [5], [44]–[48]. There is, at [5], a brief and entirely 
unparticularised suggestion that the directors placed themselves in a position of conflicting 
duty and interest, but this is only an addendum to the submission that the directors made a 
profit from their position. Furthermore, the suggestion (so far as it exists) of a conflict is not 
developed at all in the rest of the Case for the Appellants. 
69 Regal (n 1) 136–37 (Viscount Sankey), 143 (Lord Russell) and 153 (Lord Macmillan).
70 See Conaglen (n 34) 116–17.
71 E Vinter, A Treatise on the History and Law of Fiduciary Relationship and Resulting 
Trusts together with a Selection of Selected Cases, 2nd edn (London, Stevens 1938) 182–90; 
Lord Wrenbury, Buckley on the Companies Acts, 11th edn (London, Stevens 1930) 742; 
A Topham, Palmer’s Company Law, 16th edn (London, Stevens 1938) 182–83, 195–97.
72 Topham (n 71) 182.
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record why those particular submissions were made, nor why other possible 
submissions were omitted or even overlooked.
Other important omissions persisted throughout the proceedings in 
Regal; and these omissions had a profound influence on the way the case 
came ultimately to be decided, and so on the future shape of the law. There 
are at least three such omissions in the arguments, and consequently in the 
judgments, that emerge from the much more detailed picture of the facts 
found both in the pleadings and in the judgments of the lower courts. Two 
involve significant conflicts of duty and interest. These are clear conflicts, 
unlike any supposed conflict between an alleged duty incumbent on the 
directors of Regal to arrange new finance for the company, so it could 
subscribe for £5,000 worth of shares in Amalgamated,73 and the directors’ 
self-interest in making a personal investment in Amalgamated. This sup-
posed conflict has been the subject of much unprofitable speculation but is 
something of a red herring: clear findings of fact are against it.74 The third, 
more easily explicable, omission involves the question of authorisation for 
otherwise conflicted action by the directors, something raised in the original 
pleadings75 but not developed in written arguments or the judgments. A 
final, less important, omission concerns discretionary relief from liability by 
the court under section 372 of the Companies Act 1929,76 again something 
raised in the pleadings77 but not developed further in the record.
The first example of such a conflict revealed by the facts of the case con-
cerns the original capitalisation of Amalgamated. There was a proposal that 
a related company, Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd, might subscribe for the 3,000 
shares in Amalgamated that were to be issued in addition to the 2,000 
shares issued to Regal. That proposal was very quickly dismissed in favour 
of what then occurred, namely, the allotment of the 3,000 shares to Regal’s 
directors and solicitor. The directors readily agreed that Luxor’s participa-
tion would be inappropriate, given the distance from Eastbourne to both 
Hastings and St Leonards-on-Sea, which meant that Luxor had no real 
business interest in the cinemas in those two towns which Amalgamated 
was to acquire.78 Now the view the directors put may well have been 
true—and giving effect to that view might well not have caused Regal any 
loss—but that is to miss the point entirely.
73 Wrottesley J considered whether Regal might have raised money by issuing some new 
preference shares or by borrowing (Appeal Book, 86–87). In the Court of Appeal, Lord Greene 
MR was scathingly dismissive of both possibilities (Appeal Book, 112–14).
74 Ibid.
75 Defence of Gulliver, [10] and [17]; Amended Defence of Bobby, Griffiths and Bassett, [4] 
and [14]; Amended Defence of Bentley, [4] and [17].
76 Companies Act 1929, s 372 was the statutory predecessor at the material times of what 
is now Companies Act 2006, s 1157. 
77 Defence of Gulliver, [18]; Amended Defence of Bobby, Griffiths and Bassett, [15]; 
Amended Defence of Bentley, [19].
78 Appeal Book, 83E–G (Wrottesley J).
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The directors of Regal were under a duty to further, as they in good 
faith thought most appropriate, the interests of Regal when deciding how 
to capitalise a company, Amalgamated, which was formed by Regal and in 
which Regal would be the largest single shareholder.79 Yet there was a real 
risk that the performance of that duty might be compromised by their self-
interest, namely, their wish to invest personally in Amalgamated. It is the 
existence of a non-trivial risk which invokes and justifies the fiduciary rules 
prohibiting unauthorised conflict of duty and interest, not the realisation 
of that risk or the infliction of harm.80 It is no answer to say that the direc-
tors genuinely thought they were doing the right thing. That will satisfy 
their duty of good faith action; but it will not satisfy the objectively framed 
rules against conflicts of duty and interest:81 again, the very reason for the 
rules is that the directors’ subjective judgement may well be clouded—and 
not necessarily consciously clouded—by the existence of a countervailing 
interest, usually self-interest.82
Another, more serious, conflict of duty and interest arose from the even-
tual sale of the cinemas to Oxford & Berkshire Cinemas Ltd. As noted 
earlier,83 the total sale price was apportioned between the shares in Regal 
and the shares in Amalgamated on the assumption that the leases held by 
Amalgamated were worth £15,000 free of encumbrances, and the lease 
held by Regal was worth £77,500 on the same basis. It was not entirely 
clear where the figure of £15,000 came from. Wrottesley J accepted that 
it came from a Colonel Burton and his associate, acting for the originally 
anticipated purchaser of the various cinemas (London and Southern Super 
Cinemas Ltd), and that Mr Garton accepted it on behalf of the companies, 
though it might have been the other way around.84 Even if London & 
Southern did suggest the figure, it was the duty of the directors of Regal 
(and of Amalgamated) to consider whether it was appropriate, not just to 
79 This is the general duty of the directors to do what they, in good faith, believe will best 
further the interests of the company, as applied to the facts. The duty is well-evidenced in case 
law (see the summary of this duty, and of the proper purpose doctrine, in Regentcrest plc v 
Cohen [2001] 2 BCLC 81 (Ch D) [120]–[125] (Jonathan Parker J). The duty is now embod-
ied in Companies Act 2006, s 172, though with some modifications that are immaterial for 
present purposes.
80 Ex parte James (1803) 8 Ves 337, 345; 32 ER 385, 388 (Lord Eldon); Bray v Ford [1896] 
AC 44 (HL) 52 (Lord Herschell). See, generally, Conaglen (n 34) chs 4, 5 and 7(V). Contrary 
suggestions for reform have been made, inter alia, by Professor Langbein: ‘Questioning the 
Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest’ (2005) 114 Yale Law Journal 929. 
For cogent criticism of these suggestions, see Conaglen (n 34) 211–13. 
81 Ex parte James (n 80), 345; 388 (Lord Eldon); De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 ChD 286, 
316 (per curiam); Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co v Ansell (1888) 39 ChD 339, 369 
(Fry LJ); Bray v Ford (n 80) 48 (Lord Watson), 52 (Lord Herschell). See, generally, Conaglen 
(n 34) 66.
82 Conaglen (n 34) chs 4 and 5.
83 See the text to n 15.
84 Appeal Book, 83–84, 89–90.
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accept it blindly.85 That figure, even if originally suggested by London & 
Southern, then found its way into an agreement for sale to a rival purchaser, 
Oxford & Berkshire Cinemas Ltd; and it is very difficult to see how that 
could have occurred unless the defendants had suggested the figure when 
preparing the contract with Oxford & Berkshire. (Exactly what did happen 
is not recorded, but the connection between the original apportionment 
and the final contract is clear.86) Equally, and again as noted earlier, the 
shareholders in Amalgamated had a vital interest in this apportionment. 
There was, therefore, a plain conflict—or, at the very least, a real sensible 
possibility of a conflict—between the duty incumbent on the directors of 
Regal as regards the apportionment and their self-interest in the outcome 
of that apportionment. What is, perhaps, the strangest thing about this 
conflict is that Regal (and its lawyers in the case) should have been alerted 
to it by Harry Bentley’s objection to the original apportionment,87 even 
though that objection was made in the context of the offer from London & 
Southern and was framed as an objection to the profit the directors stood 
to make, rather than their conflict of duty and interest which lay behind 
that profit.
Now the lower courts were at pains to stress the integrity and propriety 
of the apportionment,88 and the House of Lords, so far as it touched on the 
matter, was content to accept that view in Regal,89 though just over a year 
earlier Viscount Simon had described the apportionment in far less positive 
terms.90 However, once again, the mere fact that a court, after the event, 
believes in the directors’ integrity is no reason why the conflicts rules do 
not apply to what happened.91 It is worth repeating: the directors’ action 
based on their honest belief satisfied their duty of good faith action; but it 
cannot, of itself, satisfy the conflicts rules which exist to guard against the 
risk of clouded judgement.
The conflicts rules may seem harsh as they apply to facts such as those 
outlined above. But it is always necessary to remember Lord Normand’s 
admonition,92 that the rules do not prohibit a fiduciary from making a 
profit per se: they prohibit him or her from making an unauthorised profit. 
While it may seem—indeed it may well be—unduly harsh to require a direc-
tor to forgo any chance whatsoever of personal profit from circumstances 
85 Appeal Book, 108–09 (Lord Greene MR).
86 Appeal Book, 115 (Lord Greene MR).
87 See the text to n 52.
88 Appeal Book, 89–90, 108–09 (Wrottesley J).
89 Regal (n 1) 142 (Lord Russell).
90 Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper (n 9) 112.
91 See the cases cited in n 81 and the text to n 112. Note also RP Meagher, WMC Gummow 
and JRF Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies 4th edn (Sydney, Butterworths 2002) para 
[5-110].
92 Dale v IRC [1954] AC 11 (HL) 27.
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in which he or she has a conflict of interest and duty, or where the profit 
stems from the director’s position as such, it is certainly not too harsh to 
prohibit those activities in the absence of permission.93 The conflicts rules 
serve to protect the fiduciary’s vulnerable principal in circumstances where 
the principal is at risk; but the rules also respect the principal’s autonomy 
by allowing the principal to waive them.
Two consequences flow from this. First, there is the immediate question 
of why the issue of authorisation was not pursued in Regal itself. Secondly, 
there is the more general question of the importance of authorisation 
mechanisms in fiduciary doctrine. The first can usefully be addressed 
now. The second is better deferred until consideration of the legacy left 
by Regal.
In the various defences of the former directors of Regal, Article 22 of 
the company’s articles was recited, and it was said that reference would be 
made to that article.94 This pleading was misconceived, for two reasons. 
First, the article, on its correct construction, authorised the directors to 
make contracts validly with the Company—that is, Regal—and partici-
pate in the profits of a contract with the Company, only provided certain 
procedural steps were taken. But that was irrelevant to what happened. 
The directors never contracted with the plaintiff, Regal, neither did they 
participate in the profits of a contract with Regal. The directors made a 
profit by first contracting with Amalgamated for the allotment and issue of 
shares in that company, and by subsequently selling those shares to a third 
party (Oxford and Berkshire Cinemas Ltd). Article 22 did not encompass 
or authorise any of that. The other reason why Article 22 proved irrelevant 
was its procedural aspects. The authorisation granted by the article would 
apply only if certain procedural steps were taken, the most important of 
which was that any director interested in a contract should not vote on any 
matter concerning it. Even if Article 22 had been prima facie applicable 
to the circumstances, it would have been impossible to use the article to 
validate what happened, because all the decisions about the relevant events 
were taken for Regal by the very directors who had a personal interest 
in them. In the circumstances, therefore, the only way the directors of 
Regal could have been released from their fiduciary duties, so as to take 
the opportunity to invest in Amalgamated without being accountable to 
Regal for it, was to seek the permission of the company in general meeting, 
something that never happened.95
93 See the text to n 124 and following.
94 Amended Defence of Bobby, Griffiths and Bassett, [4], [14]; Defence of Gulliver, [10], 
[17]; Amended Defence of Bentley, [4], [17]. All those pleadings indicated ([4], [10] and 
[4] respectively) that the articles of Amalgamated made similar provision (in fact, its Art 
18), but the pleadings did not state that reference would be made at trial to the articles of 
Amalgamated.
95 Regal (n 1) 150 (Lord Russell).
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The final, and less notable, omission in the proceedings was the complete 
failure to pursue any claim for discretionary relief from liability under 
section 372 of the Companies Act 1929. All the directors had, in their 
respective defences, raised the possibility of relief under section 372. Of 
course, in the High Court and the Court of Appeal, there was no need to 
address section 372, as the directors were not held liable in the first place. 
There is no clue why the claim for relief was not even pursued in the House 
of Lords. Maybe there was some doubt as to whether the section operated 
to allow the possibility of relief from liability to account for profits, rather 
than compensate for losses, a question that persisted until the decision, 
decades later, in Coleman Taymar Ltd v Oakes.96
F. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REVISITING REGAL: CORRECTING 
SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS
The initial reaction to Regal was muted. Contemporaneous notes in the 
Law Quarterly Review and the Conveyancer and Property Lawyer were 
not critical of their Lordships’ decision in the case, neither do they appear 
surprised by it.97 The case did not even earn a note in the Cambridge Law 
Journal or the Modern Law Review. Indeed, Regal seemed to lead a rather 
quiet life until the decision of the House of Lords in Boardman v Phipps.98 
But after that, Regal became a very prominent case, and the subject of much 
criticism.99
The directors of Regal were not the hapless victims of an unjust rule. 
They had quite deliberately put themselves in situations where their duty 
and self-interest were plainly in conflict. These conflicts were not as appar-
ent in the case as they should have been because the case was not at all 
well argued for Regal in the High Court and the Court of Appeal, and in 
the House of Lords only a salvage operation was possible: the proceedings 
in the Lords were, after all, an appeal not a re-hearing. Wrottesley J found 
the very facts which constituted the conflicts: there is no question here of 
illegitimate departure from the facts as found at trial. What happened, 
rather, was a failure to marshal those facts into the appropriate submissions 
which could then have led to a judicial decision that actionable conflicts of 
duty and interest had indeed occurred.
96 Coleman Taymar Ltd v Oakes [2001] 2 BCLC 749 (Ch D).
97 (1942) 58 LQR 434 and (1942) 6 Conv 287.
98 Boardman v Phipps (n 2). According to Westlaw and Lexis searches, Regal was cited just 
nine times in the 24 years before the decision of the House of Lords in Boardman in late 1966.
99 The leading critic of Boardman, and consequently Regal, was Professor Gareth Jones, 
‘Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary’s Duty of Loyalty’ (1968) 84 LQR 472. This criticism 
of these cases is itself controversial, because it proceeds by reference to the norms of unjust 
enrichment. 
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Such misplaced criticism demonstrates the dangers that flow from the 
poor, or incomplete, reporting of cases, particularly those that come to be 
leading cases. There may well be good reasons for the lack of reporting 
at the time. The United Kingdom was in the middle of the greatest war in 
history, and law reporting was not, perhaps, as assiduous as in better days. 
Also, the decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Regal 
did not appear to develop the law. There was neither citation nor discus-
sion of any authority in any of the judgments below the House of Lords, 
just the application to the facts of what were taken to be clear principles. 
Important points had been omitted from the arguments and the judgments. 
All this would tend to suggest that the judgments were not worth reporting 
(particularly at a time well before the easy electronic dissemination of 
information) because they were principally concerned with allegations of 
fact. But it is harder to justify the continuing failure to report the lower 
decisions—and thus obscure the wealth of highly informative material they 
contain—once the case had reached the House of Lords, and certainly once 
the case became a key authority in Boardman v Phipps.100 If the Official 
Reports could print the decision of the House of Lords in Regal as a note 
to Boardman, it is a shame that they did not publish the judgments of the 
lower courts in Regal.
The Regal litigation also emphasises some features of a case law system 
that commentators often overlook, perhaps because they make the system 
seem much less robust than is comfortable. The selection of counsel has 
a great impact on the way a case is presented, and consequently on what 
propositions of fact and law come to be decided by a court. This is unavoid-
able, but should be borne in mind: it is one of the reasons why cases should 
never be read in the same way as statutes. All texts depend on their respec-
tive contexts, but cases even more so than statutes. And yet it has been the 
fate of Regal to be addressed very much divorced from its context.
Another feature of the case law system is the importance of a judge’s 
background and knowledge. It is, again, comforting to believe that any 
judge, given the assistance of counsel, can entirely satisfactorily dispose 
of any case. But that requires an astonishing knowledge on the part of the 
judge, and no slips from counsel. The probability of serious error in such 
circumstances is much greater than in a system that recognises the reality of 
expertise. This is not to criticise the judge, however: he or she has to decide 
whatever case is heard in front of him or her. Rather, it shows the continued 
need for specialised divisions within a court, or even specialist courts, while 
leaving open the flexibility of transfers from one forum to another where 
that proves appropriate.
100 Boardman v Phipps (n 2).
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Lastly, Regal has been criticised as effectively allowing the purchasers of 
the companies to obtain a rebate of the purchase price: the directors had to 
pay Regal the profits made by selling their shares in Amalgamated, and this 
meant that the directors, as vendors, got less in return for their shares and the 
purchaser got shares in Regal that were more valuable because of the monies 
received by the company from the directors. But there is no reason why the 
general law of fiduciary duties should be distorted by the effects of corporate 
personality. Regal should not be denied a claim just because its sharehold-
ers changed. If the purchasers bought an asset, a company, that was more 
valuable than the vendors thought, because the company had claims against 
the vendors (or some of them), so be it. The vendors can always protect 
themselves by appropriate indemnities or provisions for adjustments to the 
consideration monies. And let it not be forgotten, the vendors, rather than 
the purchasers, are in a much better position than the purchasers to know 
what claims the company has and take action accordingly.
In short, sympathy is wasted on the directors of Regal. They were in 
an undoubted conflict of duty and interest, and they were in a position to 
protect themselves from the consequences of that fact through the terms of 
the sale of Regal to Oxford & Berkshire Cinemas Ltd. After all, the direc-
tors could simply have refused to sell their shares in Amalgamated unless 
those terms were acceptable, and the purchasers clearly would not have 
bought the shares in Regal without also acquiring the directors’ shares in 
Amalgamated.
G. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REVISITING REGAL: 
UNDERSTANDING THE LAW
A full re-examination of Regal makes it clear that, even given generous 
findings of fact, the case involved significant conflicts of interest, and 
not just abuse of position.101 That is not how the case is commonly seen, 
however. It has been described as ‘the apotheosis of a strict no-profit rule 
which is not dependent on a conflict requirement’.102 Neither is it how 
the House of Lords decided the case, given the way counsel presented it. 
The speeches of their Lordships rest clearly on the principle that no one 
shall make an unauthorised profit from his fiduciary position, rather than 
a prohibition on similarly unauthorised conflicts of duty and interest.103 
Viscount Sankey did re-state the rule governing conflicts of duty and 
interest,104 and Lord Wright seems to have had the conflicts rule on his 
101 See above, section E.
102 E Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford, OUP, 1999) 190.
103 Conaglen (n 34) 116–17.
104 Regal (n 1) 137, and see Conaglen (n 34) 116–17.
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mind;105 but their decision was founded on the prohibition of unauthorised 
profits, not the conflicts rules. Nevertheless, there were clear conflicts of 
interest inherent in the findings of fact made by Wrottesley J at trial of 
the case; and the influence of these conflicts is latent in their Lordships’ 
reasoning.
The fact that the House of Lords need not have relied on the no-profit 
principle if the conflicts of duty and interest in the case had been clearly 
identified and put to the House raises the more general question of whether 
there is any need for, or justification of, a rule prohibiting profits made by 
a fiduciary from his or her position, as distinct from the rule governing 
conflicts of duty and interest. (Obviously, if a fiduciary makes profits from 
assets subject to the fiduciary relationship, he or she is accountable for 
them as a steward of those assets, quite independently of any prohibition 
on profits made from a fiduciary position.106) The irony is that while this 
question remains generally important within fiduciary doctrine, it has now 
been answered, and in the negative, by section 176(4) of the Companies Act 
2006 so far as the law of directors’ duties is concerned—the area of law 
immediately at issue in Regal itself.
Section 176(4) itself may change the law as articulated in Regal, but it 
should not actually have changed the result in the case had the facts been 
presented so as to highlight the conflicts which actually existed. But it is 
possible (though rare) to conceive of a case where no conflict exists between 
a fiduciary’s duty and self-interest, and yet the fiduciary still makes a profit 
from his or her position. Is it appropriate that if the fiduciary is not a 
 director, there should be liability? Or is it better to align the general law 
of fiduciary duties with section 176(4), a possibility still open in Australia 
without the necessity (unlike in England) of a final appellate court  departing 
from its own previous (or inherited) jurisprudence?107
Some have suggested than the prohibition of unauthorised profits arising 
from a fiduciary’s position is the historical key to fiduciary duties, rather 
than the prohibition on unauthorised conflicts of duty and interest.108 
105 Regal (n 1) 154, and see Conaglen (n 34) 116–17.
106 See eg Brown v IRC [1965] AC 244 (HL), and cases as old as Rushworth’s Case (1676) 
2 Freem Chy 13, 22 ER 1026.
107 As regards Australian law, see Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178, 204–05 (Deane J); 
Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544, 559 (joint judgment of the Justices). 
In England, the Supreme Court has inherited, for want of a better word, the jurisprudence of 
the House of Lords, but the Supreme Court possesses the power to depart from decisions of 
the House of Lords and its own previous decisions: Supreme Court, Practice Direction 1.1.6, 
adopting (inter alia) the Practice Statement of 1966.
108 J Getzler, ‘Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligations’ in A Burrows 
and Lord Rodger (eds), Mapping the Law (Oxford, OUP, 2006) 577. The argument does have 
difficulty in explaining why such profits should be prohibited without either relying on the 
prohibition of conflicts, or making sweeping—but notoriously vague—appeals to subjective 
morality.
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If the legacy of such history still endured, the abolition of the prohibition on 
unauthorised profits would surely be of paramount concern. Whatever the 
merits of that position in explaining the early history of fiduciary duties, it 
is as clear as anything in a subject as hotly contested as this, that the mod-
ern foundation of fiduciary duties is the prohibition on unauthorised con-
flicts of duty and interest.109 The law might or might not have ultimately 
originated in the prohibition of profits, but if it did, it has moved on and 
found a new actuating principle.110
In other words, it is right now to regard the conflicts rules as central, and 
the profit rule as peripheral. But in that case, is there any reason to justify 
retention of the profit rule in general fiduciary law? The course of the 
Regal litigation provides the best answer. The rule prohibiting a fiduciary 
from making an unauthorised profit is a very necessary buttress to the rules 
governing a fiduciary’s conflict of duty and interest.
The starting point of any justification of the rule prohibiting unauthorised 
profits must therefore be the justification of the conflicts rules themselves. 
That is an enormous subject which has generated much controversy and 
many different views; and space does not allow a full airing of those views 
here.111 It is doubtful that every possible application of fiduciary duties 
can be justified by one single principle unless the principle is expressed in 
vague and conclusory terms, for example that fiduciary duties are justified 
by reference to the reasonable expectations of the parties. What follows is 
an effort to be more specific, albeit at the risk of omission.
The conflicts rules are duties that remove specified conduct from the 
realm of the permissible, because it would tend to jeopardise performance 
of a task that has been undertaken by a person or, occasionally, imposed 
on him or her. Some tasks that are simple and closed can quite adequately 
be controlled by specific duties to act or to refrain from action in stated 
circumstances. Such rules, however, are very ill-suited to controlling tasks 
where the person performing the task has a measure of discretion as to how 
that is done. For example, it is exceptionally difficult to stipulate specifically 
for the conduct to be undertaken by a trustee managing a trust fund or a by 
director managing a company without abolishing the managerial freedom 
the trustee or director was meant to have: there are so many different cir-
cumstances that may arise in the course of conducting the undertaking, and 
so many different, unobjectionable ways of performing the undertaking.112 
At first sight, it would appear that the law could use broad, open-textured, 
109 See Conaglen (n 34) 120–25.
110 Indeed, the very enactment of Companies Act 2006, s 176(4) is itself evidence of this 
policy choice. 
111 See the full treatment in Conaglen (n 34) ch 9.
112 R Cooter and B Freedman, ‘The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and 
Legal Consequences’ (1991) 66 New York University Law Review 1045.
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open-ended positive duties (for example, a duty to act in someone else’s 
best interests) in order to control managers without unduly limiting their 
discretion. However, such rules would be very difficult to apply, and uncer-
tain in their application: bad faith must be specifically pleaded;113 to plead 
bad faith without good prima facie evidence can have severe consequences 
for counsel,114 and bad faith is difficult to prove.115 This sort of broad duty 
would, therefore, be correspondingly likely to inhibit managerial activity 
generally. In short, such a duty would be ineffective against the wrongdoer, 
but might also inhibit the dutiful. Consequently, English law has instead 
quite rationally concluded that it is more efficient to allow the manager’s 
discretion to stand, rather than to direct it, but to forbid certain conduct 
that is inherently risky, human nature being what it is.116
Now in a case such as Regal, conflicts of duty and interest undoubtedly 
existed, but they were not easily or well identified in the course of the litiga-
tion. As a case is decided on facts pleaded by one party and either admitted 
by the other or determined by the court, a failure to allege and argue the 
facts necessary to demonstrate a profit made in conflict of duty and interest 
would result in the case being dismissed on that ground, and the profit 
retained by the fiduciary. There are two responses to this: what might be 
called the ‘purist’ and the ‘realist’ approaches. The purist response essen-
tially says ‘so be it’: if it is difficult or impossible to identify a conflict then 
the claim should fail as there is no reason why the making of a profit from 
position alone should be stigmatised, as compared to the making of a profit 
in a situation where the vices of conflicts are evident. This was the position 
taken by Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps.117 The realist response is 
essentially that ‘when a fiduciary has made an unauthorised profit out of his 
fiduciary position there will commonly or ordinarily be a conflict between 
duty and interest’,118 so that ‘the likelihood of there being a conflict in such 
circumstances is treated as sufficient justification for equity to prohibit all 
unauthorised profits, without requiring strict proof in every case that there 
was a conflict’.119 So the rule against unauthorised profits is, on this view, 
113 CPR 16 PD 8.2.
114 The Bar Standards Board’s Code of Conduct, para 704(c). See also Medforth v Blake 
[2000] Ch 86, 103 (Scott V-C).
115 See Ex parte James (n 80) (Lord Eldon).
116 See further, R Nolan, ‘The Legal Control of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest in the 
United Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors Following the Higgs Report’ (2005) 6 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 363, 372–73, republished in J Armour and JA McCahery (eds), After Enron: 
Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 367.
117 Boardman v Phipps (n 2) 128–29, as regards the principle, and 129–34, as regards the 
application of the principle to the facts of the case.
118 Conaglen (n 34) 120.
119 Ibid, 120–21.
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a deliberately over-inclusive rule fully justified by the paramount need to 
prohibit unauthorised conflicts of duty and interest.
Any over-inclusivity requires proper justification, however. The conflicts 
rules themselves have been criticised as too wide in their ambit; so much 
more so, then, the no-profits rule.120 All these rules seek to counteract 
the risk that harm may be done, rather than redress harm that has been 
done.121 Their prima facie application is therefore justified by evidence that 
there is a real risk of harm. That risk is inherent in the very formulation 
of the conflicts rules, that there must be a real possibility that a fiduciary 
might prefer his interest over his duty, and in the very fact that a profit has 
been made by the fiduciary from his office. But the risk is clearly there in 
cases covered by the no-profits rule: and Regal is an excellent example of 
just such a case, as has been shown. Vitally, however, operation of the rules 
is mitigated to an appropriate level by the curative effect of consent.122 
Consent is the key issue.
The best justification for the realist approach, therefore, lies in seeing 
the rule as a penalty default, like the prohibition of conflicts of duty and 
interest itself.123 Both rules in fact allow a fiduciary to make a profit, even 
where the fiduciary has a conflict of duty and interest or makes the profit 
from his or her position, but only if the fiduciary makes full and frank 
disclosure to the principal and the principal consents.124 In other words, the 
risks inherent in both types of case are not sufficient to warrant an absolute 
prohibition, but they are enough in each case to warrant strict procedural 
regulation, even though the risks addressed by the rule against unauthorised 
profits are less clearly visible than the risks addressed by the rule against 
conflicts of duty and interest.
Such a justification for prohibiting a fiduciary from making an 
unauthorised profit from his or her position has force, however, only if the 
120 Professor Gareth Jones wrote a classic critique (above n 99). More recent critiques are 
summarised in Conaglen (n 34) 208–13. These critiques have some, albeit obiter, support in 
authority: Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959, [2005] WTLR 1573 [82]–[83] (Arden LJ) 
and [121]–[122] (Jonathan Parker LJ).
121 See, generally, Conaglen (n 34) ch 4.
122 It is not appropriate to mitigate application of the rules by allowing the fiduciary to 
prove that what he did in prima facie violation of the rules was in fact beneficial to the fidu-
ciary’s principal. The fiduciary almost invariably is at an informational advantage vis-à-vis his 
principal, so it is far too easy for the fiduciary to portray his own actions as proper. This oper-
ates to the disadvantage of that principal in particular, and weakens the protection afforded 
by the rules in general where, ex hypothesi, there is a real risk of harm that warrants control. 
Contra, Langbein (n 80).
123 As regards penalty defaults, see eg I Ayers and R Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ (1989) 99 Yale Law Journal 87; 
M Whincop, ‘Of Fault and Default: Contractarianism as a Theory of Anglo-Australian 
Corporate Law’ (1997) University of Melbourne Law Review 187.
124 See eg Regal (n 1) 150 (Lord Russell); Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper (1965) 56 DLR 
(2d) 117 (British Columbia CA) 139 (Norris JA); New Zealand Netherlands Society v Kuys 
[1973] 1 WLR 1126 (PC); Guinness plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663 (HL).
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mechanisms for gaining the principal’s consent are workable and realistic: 
if the means of obtaining consent are too difficult, the prohibition comes in 
substance, if not in form, to be absolute, and consequently hard to justify. 
The way in which consent is given therefore becomes a vital issue which 
deserves much more attention, even though that is not a simple matter given 
that consent mechanisms vary from one fiduciary relationship to another.
In many fiduciary relationships, where the principal is sui juris and a 
single person (or a few persons jointly) it is easy to obtain the principal’s 
consent: the fiduciary simply has to make full and frank disclosure of 
material information to the principal and receive consent (or not). But the 
process for gaining consent is more complex in two key situations where 
the fiduciary is not usually dealing with such an easily identifiable principal: 
the trustee of a trust when, as is so often the case, the beneficiaries are not 
all sui juris; and the director of a company.
It is usual in express trust deeds to provide mechanisms for consent to be 
obtained otherwise than from the beneficiaries, commonly from disinterested 
trustees or from some third party such as a protector. In any professionally-
drawn trust instrument, it would be highly unusual not to find such 
provisions—they exist as standard in common and influential precedents.125 
And even if no such provision exists, it is now easier to apply to court for an 
order in its inherent administrative jurisdiction for the requisite consent.126 
In the light of these facts, the rule against unauthorised profits does not 
seem too strict, though there may well still be scope for improving the ways 
in which trustees can seek consent where their beneficiaries are not all sui 
juris and the trust instrument makes no suitable provision.
The case of company directors is now exceptional as they are governed 
by statutory duties127 rather than general fiduciary law, even though the 
relevant statutory duties are still to be interpreted with reference to general 
fiduciary law.128 Those statutory duties now have their own specific regimes 
stipulating how consent may be given for a director to act in what would 
otherwise be a breach of duty,129 though these consent regimes are not 
125 See eg Lord Millett (ed), Encyclopaedia of Forms & Precedents, 5th edn (London, 
Butterworths, 2010 re-issue) vol 40(1), paras [1855], [3825], [4903]; J Kessler and L Sartin, 
Drafting Trusts and Will Trusts: A Modern Approach, 10th edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2010) 566 (as recommended by the Society of Trusts and Estates Practitioners).
126 CPR 64 PD 64A.1A.
127 Companies Act 2006, Pt 10, ch 2.
128 Companies Act 2006, s 170(4).
129 Companies Act 2006, ss 175(4)–(6), 180(4), 232(4). Broadly, a company’s board may 
be empowered to relieve a director of the company from his or her duty under Companies 
Act 2006, s 175 (conflicts of duty and interest in directors’ dealings with third parties); but 
authority relieving the director from his or her duty under Companies Act 2006, s 176 (receipt 
of benefits by a director from third parties in consequence of his or her position) should come 
from the members of the company. It is highly doubtful that a company’s articles can alter this 
position: see n 131 below.
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without their own problems.130 Company law, therefore, can no longer 
be used to judge whether general fiduciary law is too strict in prohibiting 
unauthorised profits.
There is just one indication in company law of policy dissatisfaction 
with the general rule prohibiting a fiduciary from making unauthorised 
profits out of his or her fiduciary position. That is section 176(4) of the 
Companies Act 2006. Section 176(4) restricts the operation of the statutory 
prohibition (on the receipt of benefits by a director from third parties in 
consequence of his or her position) to situations where there is a reasonable 
possibility of a conflict of duty and interest. The prima facie prohibition in 
section 176, like the fiduciary rule prohibiting unauthorised profits, would 
be very strict—most likely too strict—if it were not limited in some way. But 
consent mechanisms are far preferable to a narrowing of the cause of action 
in situations where, ex hypothesi, the company is at a severe informational 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the company which the director can exploit. The 
restriction in section 176(4) would simply not have been necessary or war-
ranted if there were a generally workable way for a director to gain consent 
to depart from his or her duty under the section: as things stand, the better 
view is that a director must seek any such consent from the company’s 
members,131 which is not at all practicable other than in companies that 
are very closely held.
In summary, the existence of the rule prohibiting a fiduciary from making 
an unauthorised profit from his position—the great legacy of Regal, though 
a great irony too, as the case involved clear unauthorised conflicts of duty 
and interest—is justifiable, given the consent mechanisms which mitigate 
the operation of the rule. The purist position (to do without the rule) is 
undoubtedly elegant and, as such, tempting. The case for the realist posi-
tion, however, is well-made by the strange course of the Regal litigation 
itself, where conflicts of duty and interest would undoubtedly have gone 
130 G Morse (ed), Palmer’s Company Law, looseleaf edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
December 2010 release) paras [8.2909]–[8.2910], [8.3001]–[8.3008].
131 Companies Act 2006, s 180(4)(a). A company’s articles may make provision for dealing 
with a director’s conflicts of interest (Companies Act 2006, ss 180(4)(b), 232(4)); and that 
must surely extend to authorising receipt and retention of a benefit arising from the director’s 
action in accordance with such authority if the authority is to have any practical utility. But it 
is doubtful whether the articles can authorise, or make provision for authorising, acceptance 
or retention of a benefit which falls only within s 176, and not s 175 (such as a bribe or a 
commission), even though Companies Act 2006, s 176(4) means that accepting the benefit 
must be reasonably capable of giving rise to a conflict if any liability at all is to be established 
under s 176. See Companies Act 2006: Explanatory Notes (DTI 2006) [302], [344]–[346]. 
The contrary view is that while Companies Act 2006, s 176 itself does not allow a company’s 
board to authorise a director to accept a benefit from a third party, the company’s articles can 
still confer the necessary power on its board: Morse (ed) (n 130) paras [8.3007]–[8.3008]. But 
the uncertainty of the law alone is enough to inhibit the creation of sensible mechanisms, when 
they are appropriate, for a board of directors to authorise one of its members to depart from 
what would otherwise be his or her duty under s 176.
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unremedied were it not for the rule. The profits in Regal were in fact an 
entirely accurate signal of latent conflicts, and the course of the proceedings 
was equally a warning that such conflicts are not always properly identified 
and presented. The realist position allows a rule that is deliberately over-
inclusive, to guard against the risks of latent or unarticulated conflicts. But 
it must never be forgotten that the breadth of the rule is mitigated, and 
adequately mitigated, by consent mechanisms, as indeed is the apparent 
(though in all events lesser) harshness of the rule against unauthorised con-
flicts of duty and interest.132
One final point is worthy of note, though it is more of historical interest 
because section 175 of the Companies Act 2006 now governs the point. 
Even before the introduction of that section, a company’s board could use 
its powers of management under the company’s articles to authorise a direc-
tor to make a profit to the exclusion of the company, subject always to such 
procedural constraints as stipulated by those articles or the general law, for 
example in relation to voting by directors with a personal interest (or coun-
tervailing duty) in the decision.133 If the company validly used such power 
to decline the opportunity to make the profit, an individual director would 
no longer be under any duty with regard to it, and so could not suffer from 
a conflict of duty and interest with regard to it.134 But this is not what 
happened in Regal, something Lord Russell was at pains to point out.135
Such facts did arise, however, in Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper.136 The 
Supreme Court of Canada accepted the law in Regal, but the court distin-
guished Regal on its facts. The defendants in Peso had acted entirely in good 
faith in connection with the board’s decision not to pursue an opportunity; 
and they could therefore arrange for their own company to take the oppor-
tunity perfectly lawfully and they could keep the resulting profits. There 
was, in fact, no need to distinguish Regal in that way. Indeed, it is a rather 
odd distinction: as has been seen, the lower courts were unwilling to find 
that the directors acted in anything but good faith, and the House of Lords 
took the case on that basis. There is a much more basic difference between 
Regal and Peso. The facts of Peso involved simply the valid rejection of a 
132 See further Conaglen (n 34) 211–13.
133 See, eg, Table A (1929) reg 72; Table A (1948) reg 84; Table A (1985) (SI 1985/805) regs 
70 and 85 et seq. These (and similar) articles were not struck down by any of the applicable 
statutory provisions governing the exclusion or modification of directors’ duties and liabilities: 
Companies Act 1929, s 152 (the first such operative provision), Companies Act 1948, s 205, 
Companies Act 1985, s 310 (original) or ss 309A–309C (as amended): Movitex Ltd v Bulfield 
[1988] BCLC 104 (ChD). See now Companies Act 2006, s 232, especially sub-s (4). As regards 
the general law, see Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2003] 
2 BCLC 153 (ChD) [92]–[95] (Leslie Kosmin QC).
134 Even the Company Law Review misunderstood this: Final Report, para [3.22]. Compare 
Meagher, Gummow and Lehane (n 91) [5-120].
135 See the text to n 39.
136 Peso Silver Mines v Cropper (n 32).
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business opportunity by the company, so that it could subsequently be taken 
perfectly lawfully by a director acting in his personal capacity. In Peso, the 
power to take that decision was vested in the board, subject to procedural 
constraints, and was duly exercised by the board in good faith. In Regal, 
authority (if any) had to come from the general meeting as residual holder 
of power in the company.137 All of Regal’s directors were interested in the 
relevant opportunity, and thus could not pass a board resolution that would 
effectively waive the opportunity and so allow the directors to take it for 
their own benefit.138 Furthermore, Regal’s articles did not specifically allow 
(or make provision to allow) its directors to put themselves in a position 
where duty and interest might conflict in any way other than making (or 
being interested in) a contract with the company.
H. CONCLUSIONS
The history of Regal is, therefore, a strange one. It was pleaded and argued 
in a very unsatisfactory fashion. It began life as a case argued at common 
law, focused on loss caused by actions in which there were inadequately 
pleaded hints of bad faith. Only in the House of Lords did it become an 
equity case, let alone a leading case in equity. The citation and use of 
authority by the courts was utterly absent until the case reached the House 
of Lords. Indeed, the whole approach to the law by the King’s Bench 
Division and the Court of Appeal is astonishing; and that is not an anachro-
nistic criticism: the authorities examined in the case itself, when it reached 
the House of Lords, were well-established before the 1940s and quite clear 
enough to call into question the lower courts’ treatment of the law. The trial 
judge was very generous to the defendants in his findings of fact, and the 
Court of Appeal, though it had much less latitude to revisit the facts, was 
clearly well-disposed to the directors. That is significant in some ways and 
not in others. It should lay to rest the historical myth of courts determined 
to stigmatise directors; but the law has to be understood on the facts as 
found.
137 Regal (n 1) 150 (Lord Russell). As regards the residual powers of the general meeting, 
see Barron v Potter [1914] 1 Ch 895.
138 Art 22 of Regal’s articles disenfranchised a director in any board decision on a contract 
with the company in which he was interested, subject to immaterial exceptions. Neither 
Regal’s express articles, nor the provisions of Table A (1929) incorporated into its articles by 
reference, disenfranchised directors on a decision to waive an opportunity to contract with a 
third party (such as Amalgamated) and thereby allow the directors to contract with the third 
party for their own benefit. However, as a matter of general principle, a board resolution to 
that effect passed by directors in conflict of duty and interest would be ineffective to pre-
clude a subsequent claim by Regal: see now Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf 
(Limehouse) Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 153 [92]–[95] (Leslie Kosmin QC).
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The legacy of Regal is, if anything, stranger. The case has become 
widely understood as standing for a harsh and inflexible rule prohibiting 
fiduciaries from making any profit from their respective offices, with, so 
far as company directors are concerned, the sole and scant possibility of 
seeking permission from the members of the company in general meeting. 
In fact Regal was a case where there were clear and vital conflicts of duty 
and interest, rather than just abuse of position; but those conflicts were 
not articulated and argued as they should have been. And any consent to 
the conflicts of duty and interest inherent in those transactions—or to any 
profit made by the directors from the transactions and by virtue of their 
position—would have to have come from the members of company simply 
because all of the directors were interested in the relevant transactions. 
Nevertheless, the House of Lords responded to the inadequate presentation 
of the case by adopting and applying the strict rule that a fiduciary shall not 
make any unauthorised profit from his or her position. The consequence of 
that was decades of criticism and eventual statutory relaxation of the strict 
rule, in so far as company directors are concerned, by section 176(4) of the 
Companies Act 2006. The criticism, at least, might have been reduced or 
avoided if Regal had been better understood. And the strictness of the rule 
would have been better mitigated by consent mechanisms, which were not 
precluded in Regal either by doctrine or policy, rather than by narrowing 
the scope of the rule itself through section 176(4) of the Companies Act 
2006. The skewed course of the proceedings in Regal has indeed had some 
significant and enduring consequences.
